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Abstract: There are many biases concerning the application of competition law in health 
care. Quality concerns can however be integrated into competition law analysis. The aim of 
this paper is to identify the links between the application of competition law in the European 
Union and the right to quality health care and to point out the problems that arise when 
integrating quality concerns in competition law analysis. Guidelines must be issued and 
competition authorities must work together with institutions that have expertise in the   
field of health care quality measurement in order to integrate these dimensions in   
competition practice. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Concerning the question of the application of competition law to the European health care sector, 
opinions are divided. Lawyers argue that the conditions for the application of competition rules to 
health care players are generally met. Policymakers and health care institution managers are sometimes 
sceptical about the idea of applying competition law to health care. They often argue that health care is 
very different from other sectors in our economy. Hospitals, for example, do not strive for profit and 
they perform a service of general economic interest, therefore, they should not be submitted to the 
rules concerning a free market. Nevertheless, the application of competition law in health care is not a 
priori harmful, as competition law aims at protecting the patient. Moreover, the application of 
competition law does not necessarily reflect a choice for more competition and deregulation. The aim 
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of competition law is indeed to protect the consumer and, in the health care sector, the patient, from 
conduct that is anticompetitive, deceptive or unfair [1]. This paper will analyze the links between 
competition law and the right to quality health care of the patient. The right to quality health care, 
which is legally recognized in several countries in hospital laws and patient rights, gives e.g., the 
patient, in his relationship with the medical professional (and public authorities), the right to quality 
care that satisfies his needs, with respect of his human dignity and his right to self determination and 
without any discrimination on whatever ground (this is the right as provided in the Belgian patient 
rights law). To assert what can be regarded as quality care, judges take into consideration e.g., the 
standards, guidelines and other documents provided by scientific professional organizations. The 
findings below will show that quality of care is considered in different aspects of the competition  
law analysis. 
 
2. Results and Discussion  
 
2.1. Competition Law Is Applicable to Health Care Players 
 
Competition law can be divided into several policy areas. It prohibits agreements and practices 
which restrict free trading and competition between business entities and bans abusive behavior by a 
firm or institution dominating a market, or anticompetitive practices that tend to lead to such a 
dominant position. Concentrations (mergers and acquisitions that exceed certain thresholds) are 
submitted for approval by the qualified competition authorities. The competition authority will then 
investigate if the merger or acquisition is likely to lead to a dominant position, a restriction of trade, 
etc. Under European competition law, direct and indirect aid given by member states is controlled by 
article 87 EC-treaty [2].   
The question is if health care players can be considered as undertakings, in order for them to fall 
within the scope of competition law. Based on an examination of case law and literature this question 
can be answered positively. Hospitals, health professionals, health insurers (in as far as their actions do 
not involve the compulsory health insurance), pharmaceutical firms, pharmacists, etc. are undertakings 
because they perform economic activities [3]. Thus, health care players fall generally within the scope 
of competition rules, even in countries where there is little competition among health care players 
because of, e.g., extensive regulation. Therefore, when hospitals enter into agreement with other 
hospitals or with a pharmaceutical firm, they will have to comply with competition law.  
 
2.2. Barriers to Effective Competition in the Health Care Market 
 
2.2.1. Competition law presumptions 
 
The core assumption of competition law is that competitive markets will lead to an efficient 
allocation of goods and services, to the lowest prices, the highest quality, etc. Following this 
assumption, as health care players enter into competition, the patient should receive high quality care. 
According to Hyman [4] however, the health care sector has different characteristics that pose barriers 
to improving quality. Quality considerations play an important role in a patient’s selection of a health Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2010, 7          
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care provider. As patients do not have ready access to information on quality, they will not be able to 
exercise their preferences along the dimensions of health care quality that are important to them. This 
informational barrier prevents competition to have the same results in the health care market as in 
other markets with more quality transparency. There can be no competition based on quality when the 
patient lacks sufficient information.  
Therefore, various initiatives have to be undertaken to make quality information more accessible for 
the patient. In the Netherlands, transparency is already considered a very important issue in health care 
and several authorities are appointed to take steps to improve quality transparency in health care, i.e., 
the National Health Care Authority (hereinafter NZa) and the Inspection for Health Care (hereinafter 
IGZ). The NZa is qualified for transparency in health care in general (i.e.,  not only quality 
transparency) [5] and the IGZ is qualified for quality transparency. The NZa can publish information 
itself, it can retrieve information from health care players, it can set rules concerning the publication of 
information by health care players, etc. Such initiatives by an independent health care authority, or 
even maybe the competition authority, can be of great importance for quality transparency. However, 
it is necessary for these authorities to work together with other institutions that are specialized in 
quality measurement (such as the IGZ), to make sure that the information is correct and reliable for  
the patient. 
 
2.2.2. How does competition law improve quality? 
 
The application of competition law improves the quality of care by protecting the patient against 
unfair and anticompetitive practices such as abuse of dominant position, distribution agreements, etc. 
On the other hand, quality concerns can also be introduced in the competition law analysis (2.3). Some 
practices by medical professionals will be aimed at improving the quality of care, even if they restrict 
competition. In some cases, competition law will allow these practices if they provide qualitative 
efficiencies to the benefit of the patient. In the United States, where health care players have a lot more 
possibilities to enter into competition, as opposed to European countries, competition law has opened 
the door to alternative practitioners and forms of practice and enhanced quality by maximizing choice 
in the marketplace [6].  
 
2.2.3. The results from empirical research 
 
The results of empirical research on the relationship between competition and health care quality 
are not consistent [7-9]. In markets where prices are regulated by the government, e.g., Kessler and 
McClellan [10] and Tay [11] found a positive effect of competition on the quality of care. 
Gowrinsankaran and Town [12] on the other hand, found a negative effect. In markets where prices are 
not regulated but set by the companies, the results are even more variable. As it is not the scope of this 
article, I will not elaborate furthermore on the impact of competition on health care quality. Gaynor, 
whose article gives an overview of literature on this subject, believes that the next step in research 
must be to determine the factors that influence the impact of competition on the quality of care [7].  
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2.3. Quality in the Competition Law Analysis 
 
2.3.1. Introduction 
 
The question if a practice, agreement or decision by an (association of) undertaking(s) is 
anticompetitive is subject to a competition law analysis. This analysis is mainly based on price 
considerations. Quality as a competitive dimension is often ignored [13]. The main reason is that 
quality as a concept cannot be defined easily [14]. The concept consists of multiple dimensions and 
dependent on the point of view a different interpretation can be given [15]. Because quality is difficult 
to define and measure, it is also difficult to assert if a practice has a positive or negative impact on the 
quality of care. Unfortunately, competition authorities do not have much expertise in the field of health 
care quality [16]. Nevertheless, a review of European and national regulation, case law and literature 
shows that quality can sometimes be integrated into the competition law analysis, especially the 
“efficiency”-dimension [17]. 
 
2.3.2. Efficiency as a dimension of quality in competition law 
 
Agreements that restrict competition can, at the same time, provide efficiency gains that contribute 
to improving competition. Efficiencies may create additional value by lowering the cost of producing 
an output, improving the quality of the product or creating a new product. When the pro-competitive 
effects of an agreement outweigh its anti-competitive effects the agreement is on balance   
pro-competitive and compatible with the objectives of the Community competition rules [18]. 
Hospitals can agree to collectively provide some hospital services to prevent overlap, to improve the 
quality of the hospital service and to attend to the needs of the population. This type of agreement can 
be anti-competitive, but if the pro-competitive effects, provided by the improvement of quality and the 
efficient allocation of services, outweigh the anti-competitive, it can fall under the exemption. This 
exemption is provided under European competition law in article 81 (3) EC-Treaty. For the application 
of this article four conditions have to be fulfilled. The agreement: (1) must contribute to improving the 
production or distribution of goods or contribute to promoting technical or economic progress; (2) 
consumers must receive a fair share of the resulting benefits; (3) the restrictions must be indispensable 
to the attainment of these objectives and (4), the agreement must not afford the parties the possibility 
of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in question.  
For health care it is of great importance that cost efficiencies, as well as qualitative efficiencies can 
be considered when applying article 81 (3) EC-Treaty. In its communication of April 27, 2004, the 
European Commission expressively states that in some cases quality improvements and other 
qualitative efficiencies can be the most important efficiency gain provided by an agreement. 
Unfortunately, in practice, qualitative efficiencies are rarely considered in the competition law 
analysis. In some cases a quality decrease is considered as an anti-competitive disadvantage. In the 
case Amicon Verzekeraar Vrijgevestigd Fysiotherapeut, the Dutch Competition Authority (hereinafter 
NMa) considered that pricing agreements for the purchase of physiotherapeutic care do not only 
eliminate price competition, but also discourage physiotherapists to compete on quality of services. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2010, 7          
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A merger can also provide efficiency gains that outweigh the negative effects of the merger on 
competition [19]. The relevant benchmark in assessing efficiency claims is that consumers will not be 
worse off as a result of the merger. For that purpose, efficiencies should be substantial and timely, and 
should, in principle, benefit consumers in those relevant markets where it is otherwise likely that 
competition concerns would occur. Efficiencies are relevant to the competitive assessment when they 
are a direct consequence of the notified merger and cannot be achieved to a similar extent by less 
anticompetitive alternatives. In these circumstances, the efficiencies are deemed to be caused by the 
merger and thus, merger-specific. As in most circumstances it will be able to obtain the same 
qualitative efficiencies by other agreements, less radical than a concentration, this requirement will 
rarely be fulfilled.  
Recently, in the case Ziekenhuis Walcheren-Oosterscheldeziekenhuizen on March 25, 2009, the 
NMa allowed a concentration of hospitals based on an efficiency defense. According to the hospitals, 
the concentration was necessary because in time it would be harder for them to provide even basic care 
and the risk that just one of the hospitals could survive was deemed realistic. In order for the hospitals 
to fulfill their qualitative goals and to guarantee the continuity of care, a concentration was necessary. 
According to the hospitals the efficiency gains would outweigh the anti-competitive consequences. For 
its assessment of the quality improvements, the NMa worked together with the IGZ, which is 
specialized in quality measurement. The IGZ gave an advisory opinion in this case, finding that the 
merger would indeed provide qualitative efficiencies, but that these efficiencies were not sufficiently 
verifiable. As a result, the parties suggested some remedies for the merger to take place, such as the 
obligation to report to the NMa some time after the merger took place, to verify that the qualitative 
efficiencies were accomplished. Finally, the NMa allowed the merger on these grounds. It was the first 
time qualitative efficiencies had been evaluated for a hospital merger. The decision of the NMa 
(together with other decisions in hospital merger cases) was criticized by competition law scholars. 
Concerns rose especially regarding the magnitude of the hospitals (and their market dominance) [20]. 
An appeal decision in this case is awaited. 
 
2.3.3. Services of general interest, quality of care and regulation regarding state aid 
 
In European competition law, quality is indirectly an important topic in the relationship between 
health care players and the government concerning services of general economic interest. In 
accordance with article 86 (2) EC-Treaty, undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of 
general economic interest or having the character of a revenue-maximizing monopoly are subject to 
the competition rules, insofar as the application of such rules does not obstruct the performance, in law 
or in fact, of the particular tasks assigned to them. The service of general interest is necessary in order 
to ensure continuity and quality of care. When the government entrusts health care players with the 
operation of a service of general interest health care quality is an important aspect. The government 
often imposes obligations for these services such as continuity (the obligation to provide the service 
regardless of the fact whether or not there is sufficient demand for this service), minimal requirements 
regarding quality, frequency of the provided service, etc. Because of the exemption of article 86 (2) 
EC-Treaty, anti-competitive practices can be allowed when they are necessary to perform the tasks of 
general economic interest, e.g., because they are necessary to provide a qualitative service [21]. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2010, 7          
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Article 86 (2) EC-Treaty is also of importance for state aid regulation (article 87 EC – Treaty). In 
the Altmark Trans case the European Court of justice has set the conditions to accept compensations 
provided for services of general economic interest. The recipient undertaking must actually have 
public service obligations to discharge and those obligations must be clearly defined. The parameters 
on the basis of which the compensation is calculated must be established both in advance and in an 
objective and transparent manner. The compensation cannot exceed what is necessary to cover all or 
part of the costs incurred in the discharge of the public service obligations, taking into account the 
relevant receipts and a reasonable profit [22]. Procedurally, this means that EU member states need not 
notify such compensation to the Commission. When these conditions are met, compensations provided 
for services of general economic interest, even if they distort or threaten to distort competition by 
favoring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods, will be compatible with the   
common market.   
Whether or not health care players are entrusted with services of general economic interest is 
difficult to say, and needs a case by case approach. The act of entrustment may be by way of 
legislative measures or regulation. An undertaking may also be entrusted through the grant of a 
concession or license governed by public law. According to the European Commission [23], e.g., the 
Dutch health insurers are entrusted with a service of general economic interest when they provide the 
compulsory health insurance. Therefore, they fall within the scope of article 86 (2) EC-Treaty.  
 
2.4. Discussion 
 
Although quality concerns can be integrated into the competition law analysis, in practice they 
rarely are. Judges don’t have the expertise to verify quality improvements or decreases caused by 
agreements or practices by undertakings. Therefore guidelines must be issued in order for courts to be 
able to integrate the concept of quality in their analysis. These guidelines are particularly necessary for 
the application of qualitative efficiencies under the exemption of article 81 (3) EC-Treaty and in 
concentration control. To issue these guidelines, competition authorities have to work together with 
institutions, specialized in quality of care measurement, as they do have the expertise to adequately 
analyze quality of care issues. The example was given of the Netherlands, where the NMa works 
together with the NZa and the IGZ. They are authorized to advise in certain cases and they work 
together with the NMa in publishing policy papers. Guidelines are also necessary involving services of 
general economic interest. It is not clear if or when health care players are entrusted with the operation 
of services of general economic interest. To provide certainty on the requirements the European 
authorities need to issue clear guidelines. 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
Health care players fall generally within the scope of competition rules, even in countries where 
there is little competition among health care players because of e.g., extensive regulation. The 
application of competition rules on the health care market does however not imply a choice for more 
competition. Competition law aims at protecting the patient and competitors against conduct that is 
anticompetitive, deceptive or unfair.  Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2010, 7          
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Quality as a competitive dimension is often ignored by courts. The main reason is that quality as a 
concept can not easily be defined. There are however links between competition law and quality health 
care. Efficiency is a dimension of quality that can be integrated in the competition law analysis. 
Indirectly, quality is also an important topic in the relationship between health care players and the 
government concerning services of general economic interest. It is not clear if or when health care 
players are entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest.  
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